Humanitarian Missile Attack? Responsibility to Protect (Redux)

MPSA blog - Humanitarian Missile Attack?

“There’s not any sort of option where a political solution is going to happen with Assad at the head of the regime…. regime change is something that we think is going to happen because all of the parties are going to see that Assad is not the leader that needs to be taking place for Syria”  – U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley (April 9, 2017)

As the ongoing and complicated intrastate war in Syria festers in the shadow of the tragedies in Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia and Kosovo and the smoldering conflicts in South Sudan, Burundi and Ukraine (to name only a few), the latest action by the Trump Administration is worthy of examination. Ongoing calls for direct intervention to stop flagrant human rights violations have not yielded real results. It begs the questions of the responsibilities of the state for the welfare of its citizens and what responsibilities other states have to those impacted by intrastate wars.

The answers may indicate a reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty and internationalize the protection of human rights. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization to protect people in the target state (Murphy). The debate around the issue of protecting of human rights juxtaposes interventions in support of universal human rights against the premium of national sovereignty (Booth). Third-party state(s) intervention can be examined through the prism of two questions. First, what is the status of “sovereignty” if a government exercises authority or acquiesces to actions detrimental to the citizens? Second, can a new paradigm of legitimatized humanitarian interventions be reconciled with the asymmetry of power between states?

The state is a pillar of the international community where the sovereign state is the primary and most powerful actor in international relations (Mearsheimer). Others argue, however, that the state has lost some of its potency as a political variable and have elevated the role of non-state actors Keck & Sikkink. Further, the authority of the state “is, increasingly, being either shared with, sustained by, or constrained by these proliferating authorities” (Strange). Yet persuasiveness of either position is debatable. Following the Bush administration’s (mis)adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration’s reticence about direct involvement in regime change and nation building was understandable. Some suggest those were lessons too-well-learned leading to an overly hands-off policy. In the case of Syria, the Assad regime remains the de facto and de jure government of Syria with all the rights and responsibilities represented in part by its seat at the U.N. Recent developments under the Trump Administration is a pivot in this crisis. The firing of 59 missiles at a Syrian airbase by the U.S. Navy on April 7, 2017 should cause pause about the role of powerful states in the international community. The position of the Trump Administration is further complicated by the seemingly contradictory statements on Syria. First U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the attack was a one-off event in response to the chemical attack on civilians by Syria’s Assad regime on April 5, 2017 and that the removal of President Assad is not the number one priority for the U.S. Then, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley said that peace is not possible in Syria while President Assad remains in power (Schulberg).

An examination of the U.S. policy developing out of the Kosovo intervention in 1999 may clarify the state’s criteria for supporting humanitarian intervention. Following President Clinton’s March 24, 1999 speech on U.S. involvement, then-National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, offered three criteria underpinning the policy: (a) there must be genocide or ethnic cleansing; (b) the U.S. must have the capacity to act; and (c) a U.S. national interest must be at stake (Brown). It should be noted, however, that the commitment to act does not reflect any international commitment but primarily reflects U.S. interests. Using this as a benchmark, does the decision to Syrian attack satisfy these criteria? Clearly, there is genocide and the U.S. has the capacity to act. Establishing the validity of the third criteria is a bit more nebulous. Is the disaster in Syria a threat to U.S. national security? The debates continue on this issue.

This dynamic of intervention policy and use of force for humanitarian interventions, concerns some states. Smaller and weaker states are concerned that this trend makes them possible targets of “humanitarian intervention” by stronger states. A Reuters report on the North Korean response is exemplary of this concern. The unnamed North Korean spokesperson is reported as saying that the Syrian attack supported and justified its drive for nuclear weapons as a shield to any possible intervention. As a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group heads to the Korean Peninsula, Secretary Tillerson states that the North Korean nuclear missile program is dangerous and something must be taken to stop it. While the U.S. appeals to China to do more to rein in North Korea, the U.S. President tweets that the U.S. will deal with the Korean problem even without China’s help. Meanwhile, the North Koreans state they will respond to what it calls reckless aggressive actions by U.S. (Reuters). Further, Russia and Iraq who are allies of the Assad regime characterize the U.S. missile attack as aggression which crosses “red lines” (Reuters). Cynics may wonder if that is the same “red lines” President Assad crosses when he bombs and gases civilians. Finally,

Despite discussions about prevention and enforcement of international law (Wang; Damrosch), the focus continues to be on armed interventions (jus ad bellum or “right to war”) and the nexus between protection and international criminal tribunals (jus post bellum or “justice after war”). The 2011 removal of President Gadhafi and the ensuing chaos in Libya is a good case study for the disadvantage of not having an international agreement on guidelines and frameworks for interventions (Thakur). It is unclear, however, how far the Trump Administration is willing to go in Syria, North Korea or anywhere else based on the current mixed signals about its guiding policy or plan of action.

Meanwhile, wars smolder and rage in the hotspots around the world precipitating death, destruction of vital infrastructure, internal populations displacement, refugee crises, and economic pressure on neighboring states. Without clear international leadership, a seemingly paralyzed global community struggles with sporadic attempts at cease fires, limited humanitarian aid and now a 59 missile attack on a single target is characterized as a response to genocide.

About the Author: Harold Young is an Assistant Professor at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. His research area is Public Law and examines an American and comparative perspective on judicial institutional changes and decision making. Previously, he was a health communications project manager, a social worker and an attorney-at-law. He can be reached via email at youngh@apsu.edu.

Alone and Working: Making the Transition to ABD

Alone and Working: Making the Transition to ABD

The change from being a PhD Student to a PhD Candidate is a big one. The moment we cross that threshold of becoming ABD, we fall in to a kind of purgatory where we are no longer students and not yet peers of our professors. This purgatory, or as it is better known as ABD, is something that no one prepares you for. One of us (Harold Young) went through the process in the last two years and the other (Adnan Rasool) just started down this path a couple of months ago after I defended my dissertation prospectus.

Here we share our common experiences.

So what changes? What do we do? Why it matters and how do you survive this process?

The biggest change is that you are on your own. As one my professors keeps saying “you are on a little island all by yourself, trying to find a way back”. That is the reality and the way back is finishing the dissertation project. While the first few years of grad school provide the tools and framework needed to survive, during this phase there is little to no accountability leaving you alone to figure out how to harness the discipline needed to complete the dissertation.

But how does one go about doing this? Well you start figuring it out when you acknowledge and accept that you are virtually alone in this now. That realization eventually does hit even if it might take a few weeks or months. But when it hits home, that is when you realize a host of other things as well.

Firstly, you are no longer treated as a student. You are treated like a future peer. This means that the way your work is viewed is significantly different and the expectations are much higher. The kind of mistakes you could have made and powered through are no longer acceptable. More importantly, you cannot depend on constant guidance and advice of your mentors and professors because that part of the program is over. The only time you will get detailed feedback is when you submit significant chunks of your dissertation project.

While the department remains cognizant of you and wants to see you finish on time and hit the job market, they leave it to you to decide when to do that. What we mean by that is, the only time you will go back to the department is when students are specifically required to be there (e.g., student symposiums), need signatures or for scheduled practice sessions for job interviews. Otherwise, the only departmental contact you have is with your committee and specifically with the chair of your committee.Alone and Working: Making the Transition to ABD

Secondly, you will very quickly realize that your cohort is splitting up and going their own ways. Because everyone is working at a different pace on different projects, the tendency is for the comradery of the first few years of grad school to dissipate. You need to be prepared for your social circle to slowly thin and change over time. There is a certain amount of emotional toll the ABD experience and dissertation writing process takes on you and that should be expected. The best thing one can do is to prepare for it in advance by acknowledging this will happen.

Lastly, acknowledge and understand that this will be grueling process but ultimately you will be rewarded. You are here because you love learning and producing knowledge. This is the most time you will ever get to dedicate yourself to the singular pursuit of knowledge, so enjoy it. And while you do this, keep an eye on the job market. Your timeline depends greatly on the job market you wish to enter. The decision to enter the job market after writing a few chapters or waiting till finishing the whole project determines how you settle yourself in for the long haul. So, keep an eye on that and make reasonable accommodations.

Reach out and thrive!

The purpose of this piece is to talk about not just surviving but thriving during the hardest part of the PhD. Program. The clichés ”you cannot edit your head, so write” and “a good dissertation is a finished dissertation” ring true. However, getting to that goal is fraught with mental, emotional and physical stress. So, reach out to those are in the same phase or have recently succeeded, acknowledge your fears, discuss strategies and make new friends in the process. You will be pleasantly surprised at the friendships you make as they are the only people who can relate. That is actually a major reason we are such good friends.

The going can be tough but that is the whole point of academic rigor and pursuit of knowledge at the ultimate level. You can do it and, when you succeed, be there for the next ABD newbie!

 

About the Authors:

Adnan Rasool is a PhD Candidate & Student Innovation Fellow 2016-2017 at Georgia State University. He is also the recipient of the Taiwan Fellowship for 2017 by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC. His research focuses on role of bureaucracies in democratization and populist clientalistic appeal in new democracies. You can also find Rasool on Twitter and his website.

Harold Young is an Assistant Professor at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. His research area is Public Law and he examines an American and comparative perspective on judicial institutional changes and decision making. Previously he was a social worker, a health communications project manager, and an attorney-at-law. He can be reached via email at youngh@apsu.edu.

 

Race and “Ism”: Incoming Fire from All Directions

Since it is impossible to discuss the issue of racism from the beginning, I will just start where I find myself. As an Assistant professor, it is probably safe for me to say that the multi-directional pressures and demands from administrations, departments, students, and parents are universal in academic life. What is different for faculty of color is the racism in the form of micro-aggressions encountered while going about the tasks of engaging a diverse student body and fulfilling other responsibilities in a challenging social and political environment. We are charged with supporting our students who also share these experiences. In “Blackballed: The Black and White Politics of Race on America’s Campuses, Ross (2015)”, Lawrence Ross points out that it never seems to matter when or how often we bear witness to these realities, the incidents are marginalized as being isolated, or the acts of “one bad apple”.

barrydeutsch_theonesilike
Used with permission. See more and support the artist: http://www.patreon.com/barry

My goal here is to share some divergent experiences to reinforce to others that we, as faculty of color, are neither alone nor insane, or even overly-sensitive. Here are a few examples of what I have personally encountered:

  1. During a faculty orientation, the facilitator suggested the primary way of recognizing when a student was experiencing high anxiety or having a panic attack in class was a change in complexion. This is a “curious” indicator considering that approximately 20% of our students identify as Black or African American. Even considering the diversity within that group, the facilitator seemed completely oblivious to the inappropriateness of that indicator for those identifying as Black or African American where there would be no apparent physical change in complexion.
  2. I witnessed a Black female student recounting her anxiety about being judged about how she styled her hair: (a) If she went “natural” it may be interpreted as making a radical statement by the mainstream community; (b) a hair wrap might be critiqued as being “Aunt Jemima” and (c) wigs and other forms of “fake” hair might be interpreted as an identity crisis or trying to fit in. Her words to her classmate were literally, “you just don’t understand what Black women go through!”
  3. Following a controversial police shooting of unarmed Black men last year, I participated in two public forums in Fall 2016 which included law enforcement. A police chief opened his remarks by referring to Ferguson as the start of the problem between law enforcement and the black community. When the point was raised that it is a 400-year-old problem, he immediately apologized and backtracked – standard responses when caught marginalizing and isolating the issue. Many attendees were obviously traumatized by the recent events (I say this not because of any complexion variation that may or may not occurred) and expressed fear of any possible encounter with law enforcement.
  4. From the discussion in the forum mentioned above, the law enforcement representatives seem to have little understanding of the differences between community relations and community engagement. While the police chief was touting police-youth programs (public relations), I personally witnessed three White officers harassing three young Black men over a vehicle moving violation. The situation escalated to the point where one of the young men was pulled out of the car where he crouched as the officers searched the vehicle (and found nothing) while shouting at all three. Despite their “public relations” activities, this is an example how law enforcement engages the community.
  5. In another forum, a White colleague expressed his complete understanding of racial discrimination because he has had a ponytail since the 1960s and 1970s and often felt rejected by some of his counterparts. It never seemed to occur to him that while he could choose to cut his hair, skin color is not a choice.
  6. Finally, I attended a social gathering at a recent political science conference. Not recognizing anyone, I introduced myself to two colleagues and took a sip of wine. Seconds later a gentleman asked to join the table, introduced himself to my colleagues, then on looked directly into my face and turned his head without introducing himself. Make what you will of that!

As faculty of color, we must manage ourselves, encourage our students, and promote learning in sometimes less than ideal social climates. This task is often complicated by the denial or minimizing of the problems by segments of university communities and the society as a whole. We have to carefully choose when, where and how to respond to incoming fire lest we be labelled thin-skinned and aggressive. There are no simple answers, but know that you are not in this alone. As positive outcomes are dependent on multiple veto players, it is incumbent upon our personal leadership and the leadership of our colleagues, regardless of racial identity, to acknowledge these societal problems and constructively engage with one another to develop strategic approaches to support one another. We then must follow through, and repeat!

About the author: Harold Young is an Assistant Professor at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. His research area is Public Law and he examines an American and comparative perspective on judicial institutional changes and decision making. In previous lives, he was a social worker, a health communications project manager, and an attorney-at-law. He can be reached via email at youngh@apsu.edu.

 

 

 

MPSA Blog: Top 10 Posts from 2016

MPSA Blog: Top 10 Posts from 2016

Regardless of your research interests, your academic (or Alt-Ac) role, or your aspirations for the new year, there is something on this list of MPSA’s most popular blog posts from 2016 that is sure to pique your interest:

MPSA would especially like to thank regular contributors Newly Paul, Adnan Rasool, Michael A. Smith, and Harry Young for sharing their research, political perspectives, and pedagogical insights with us this calendar year. We look forward to highlighting even more NSF-Funded research, conference presentations, and MPSA member interviews in the coming months. If you’re interested in sharing your work with MPSA’s members and the discipline, we’d love to hear from you.

Best wishes for a safe and productive 2017!

Supranational Courts: Are they the New Legal Titans?

The International Court of Justice
The Hague, Netherlands – August 2, 2016: The International Court of Justice is the primary judicial branch of the United Nations. Seated in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands.

In October 2016, South Africa followed Burundi in withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC) asserting bias by the United Nation’s Security Council in its case referrals (Duggard, 2013; Strydom, 2015; The East African, 2016). They point out that the United Nations Security Council has referred cases from Sudan and Libya with only black Africans brought before the court (BBC, 2015). South Africa and other African states charge that the ICC has “lost its direction” (Strydom, 2015). Established in 1959, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is another exemplary supranational court. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Conservative Party pledges to sever ties with the ECtHR (Travis, 2015) as it impinges on British sovereignty (Watt, 2015). The previous Labour Party government was supportive of the ECtHR and continues to support it while in opposition (Hansard, April 26, 2016). During the last half century, there has been a marked increase in the number of supranational courts and the number of acceding states. Having acceded, however, why do states sever ties with supranational courts?

In acceding, states delegate legal decision-making authority to supranational courts (Helfer and Slaughter, 1997).  As the highest court in the judicial system, the final appellate court is the last judicial forum reviewing legal challenges. A central issue for all states, therefore, is the organization of the judiciary and its role in furthering “peace, order and good government” (POGG) as a feature of constitutional rule (Yusuf, 2014).  The final court lends legitimacy to the policies of the governing coalition, which Dahl (1957) describes as the congressional “lawmaking majority” (284). This legitimizing role makes the judiciary an important participant in the national decision-making process (Dahl, 1957) as governing coalitions pursue their visions of POGG. It is itself, therefore, a “national policy maker” (Dahl, 1957). Shapiro (1964) refers to this notion as “political jurisprudence” (16). As challenges to policies percolate up the judicial hierarchy, legitimization of those policies by the judiciary is an important issue (Dahl, 1957). Reliance upon a supranational court as the final appellate court is seemly incompatible with the modern notion of sovereignty (Swinfen, 1987). I suggest, therefore, that the governing coalitions will seek to remove the supranational court if it perceives a disconnection with the court. This perception is influenced by changes in the political environment that make the state more sensitive to a court over which it has no direct control. If the governing coalition perceives a disconnection with the court, the remedy is to replace it with a national court. I suggest that states sever ties when they perceive the court as incompatible with the policies goals of the governing coalition. This potential juncture is a function of a change in the political environment that increases the disconnection between the governing coalition and the supranational court.  At that juncture, it is more likely that the governing coalition will abandon the court. The importance of the political will to effect change was summarized by the former President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. He stated in 1976 that he had no doubt that the questions surrounding severing ties with the JCPC “are ultimately political questions” (Richardson, 1997).

International Criminal Court
The Hague, Netherlands – July 5, 2016: The International Criminal Court forecourt, entrance and sign at the new 2016 opened ICC building.

I assert that the political environment can be captured in three categories – drastic change, subtle change, and no change. I define the categories as follows: (1) no change – the state does not experience any change in the political environment when a new governing coalition comes to power with a commitment to the constitution and the continued good governance of the state. This does not preclude law reform, but does not fundamentally change the relationship between the state and its citizens. While there may be a new governing coalition after an election cycle, the basic tenets of a free political environment continue. The new coalition basically pursues the same broad policies but pledges to do a better job; (2) subtle change – the election of a governing coalition with a new vision that underpins new domestic and international policies (Elordi, 2000). These are pursued without fundamental systemic changes to the governing institutions or the rights and liberties of the citizens of the state. While this may also involve constitutional changes, the changes do not fundamentally change the governance landscape (Grace, 2015); and (3) drastic change – includes the promulgation and adoption of a new constitution that fundamentally changes the governing institutions, as well as the rights and liberties of the citizens of the state. In other words, these changes generally alter the relationship between the citizens and the state, or they expand or reduce the range of fundamental constitutional rights (Grace, 2015; Thoburn v Suderland City Council, 2003). Though the process may differ, drastic and subtle changes increases the likelihood that ties with the supranational court will be severed but no change maintains the status quo.

There is evidence that supranational courts will continue emerge in the world community (Specht, 2015). As supranational courts such as the ICC, the ECtHR, the International Court of Justice, the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights continue to adjudicate and other courts emerge around the proliferation of international law, understanding the dynamic relationship with states is crucial. Ultimately, ties with supranational courts depends much less on the performance of the court. It is the governing coalition’s emergent political will in a changed political environment that drives the relationship with the court. The future of supranational courts, therefore, depends on the domestic political environment that influences governing coalition commitment to development and vibrancy of supranational courts.

About the author: Harold Young is an Assistant Professor at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. His research area is Public Law and examines an American and comparative perspective on judicial institutional changes and decision making. In his previous lives, he was a social worker, a health communications project manager and an attorney-at-law. He can be reached via email at youngh@apsu.edu.

 

In the Shadow of Tragedies: Our Responsibility to Protect

MPSA Blog - In the Shadow of Tragedies: Our Responsibility to Protect

“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.”
     – Kofi Annan (1999), Former Secretary General of the United Nations

In the shadow of the tragedies in Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia and Kosovo, the world is witnessing the horror of the ongoing and complicated intrastate war in Syria and the smoldering conflicts in Burundi and Ukraine (to name only a few). Calls for intervention to stop flagrant human rights violations have not yielded real results. It begs the question of the responsibilities of the state for the welfare of its citizens and what responsibilities other states have to those impacted by intrastate wars.

The modern state is generally recognized as having emerged in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Year War (1618-1648). The state is a pillar of the international community where the sovereign state as the primary and most powerful actor in international relations (Mearsheimer 2001). Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue, however, that the state has lost some of its potency as a political variable and have elevated the role of non-state actors. Further, the authority of the state “is, increasingly, being either shared with, sustained by, or constrained by these proliferating authorities” (Strange 1995, 67). The growth and thickening of international law, therefore, is an important issue as the role the state plays in global politics evolves.

The effects of these changes indicates a reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty and internationalizes the protection of human rights. This may be opening the door for more internationally sanctioned humanitarian intervention particularly when the state is experiencing intrastate conflict. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization to protect people in the target state (Murphy 1996). Humanitarian intervention also includes those state interventions whose declared goal is to stop or prevent human suffering though the intervening state(s) may have unrelated and/or underlying motives for intervening (Voon 2002). The debate around the issue of protecting of human rights, therefore, juxtaposes the support of universal human rights against the premium of national sovereignty (Booth, 2001). Further, the idea of international human rights law departs from the concept of state sovereignty and the state-centric approach to international law (Brown 1999). Finnemore’s (2003) assertion that post-cold war intervention in states are legitimized when based on humanitarian grounds, not only changes the purpose for which interventions are used but possibly rearranges the concept of sovereignty (see also Ling 2013; Hopwood 2013).

This issue of a third party state(s) intervention can be examined through the prism of two questions. First, what is the status of ‘sovereignty’ if a government exercises authority or acquiesces to actions detrimental to the citizens? Second, can a new paradigm of legitimatized humanitarian interventions be reconciled with the asymmetry of power between states? An examination of the U.S. policy developing out of the Kosovo intervention in 1999 may be helpful in understanding the state’s criteria for supporting humanitarian intervention. Following President Clinton’s speech on U.S. involvement, National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, offered three criteria underpinning the policy: (a) there must be genocide or ethnic cleansing; (b) the U.S. must have the capacity to act; and (c) a U.S. national interest must be at stake (Brown 1999). It should be noted, however, that the commitment to act does not reflect any international commitment but primarily reflects U.S. interests.

This combination of state foreign policy doctrine and use of force for humanitarian interventions, concerns some states. Smaller and weaker states are concerned that this trend makes them possible targets under the ruse of a ‘humanitarian intervention’ by stronger states (Hall 2013). This dampens clamors for intervention in other troubled states as leaders wonder if they could be next. Even more powerful states have reservation as was seen with Russian opposition the intervention in Kosovo although that did not preclude their intervention on the Crimean Peninsula. In reality, condemnation of or action in support of human rights are not distributed equitably to suspected and known violators (Schachter 1995).

The literature is not short on suggested ways forward. Despite discussions about prevention and enforcement of international law (Wang 2004; Telhami 1995; Damrosch 1993), the focus continues to be on armed interventions (jus ad bellum) and the nexus between protection and international criminal tribunals (jus post bellum). Former U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan (Annan 2012), calls for the international community to “devote our energies to strengthening and using those measures short of the use of force. These must include more effective and enforced use of targeted financial, travel, and economic sanctions on the leadership” (para 28). I suggest, therefore, that the primary goals should be twofold. First, preventing the crisis in the first place thereby retaining the integrity of the individual, the state, the U.N. and international law system. Second, building the political will to respond to crisis thereby upholding the world community’s commitment to human rights and international law with force as a last resort. Meanwhile, wars rage and smolder in the hotspots around the world as a seemingly paralyzed international community struggles with sporadic attempts at cease fires and humanitarian aid to victims.

About the author: Harold Young is an Assistant Professor at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. His research area is Public Law and examines an American and comparative perspective on judicial institutional changes and decision making. In his previous life he was a health communications project manager, a social worker and an attorney-at-law. He can be reached via email at youngh@apsu.edu.